This article first appeared in the St. Louis Beacon, March 2, 2011 - The momentous events surrounding President Mubarak's resignation raise three vital questions: First, what are the prospects for stable democratic transition in Egypt? Second, what are the implications for Arab-Israeli relations and American's role in the region? And third, what are the consequences if a viable democracy does emerge from the old regime?
Regarding prospects for a stable democratic transition in Egypt, commentators have been searching for an appropriate historical analogy. Just as the 1989 revolutions in Eastern Europe were the world's first "television revolutions," so Tunisia and Egypt have become its first "Facebook revolutions," with street protests in one country being copied as a result of news spreading through the internet. As with Tiananmen Square in China in 1989, the threat of a crackdown loomed over events. As with the revolution in Iran in 1979 (Feb. 11 was its 32nd anniversary), there are concerns about a radical regime emerging.
Yet the best comparison has not been widely made, namely the 2004-05 Orange Revolution in Ukraine. As with the Orange Revolution, a real opportunity exists for a genuine democratic transition to take place. At the same time, the preconditions for democracy -- large middle class, pluralistic civil society and stabilizing influences from outside powers -- are only partially present. This means that, as remains the case with Ukraine, the situation in Egypt really could go either way.
Who emerges as Mubarak's successor, the choices made by the Egyptian military, and how Egypt is influenced by the U.S. and regional powers will be critical to what happens. Mubarak has gone, but the future for Egypt remains radically open.
Regarding the peace process and America's role in it, the current crisis throws into relief the fact that the Camp David Accords were only ever a Band-Aid solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Indeed, in retrospect what is remarkable is that the settlement lasted so long given its fragility. This may come as a surprise to a generation of diplomats who have grown accustomed to viewing the separate peace between Egypt and Israel that Camp David represented as the cornerstone for regional relations. It should not have done. While the accords outlasted Sadat, they would only ever last as long as the repressive regime stayed in power.
Barring overthrow of the political establishment in Egypt, the new regime will retain the imprint of the Egyptian military, which will be reluctant to shed its ties with its American patron. Yet even a moderate democratic regime that retains ties with the military will be reluctant to align itself as closely with Israel as the Egyptian government has for 40 years. If America is wise, it will view this as an opportunity to adopt a more comprehensive approach to the peace process that deals with the occupied territories.
The most tantalizing questions raised by the revolution in Egypt relate to the implications for the wider world if what is taking place there represents the beginning of constitutional democracy. What would a reasonably democratic and moderately nationalistic and Islamic Egypt look like and what role would it play in the global order?
Here there is actually a clear answer -- it would look like Turkey. Both Egypt and Turkey are 'gateway' countries emerging as commercial hubs, both have similarly large territories and populations, both have a nationalist and Islamic heritage, both share similar traditions of authoritarianism and military involvement in politics, and both are undergoing democratic transitions.
An Egypt more like Turkey is likely to have different relations with Israel than Egypt has done since the late 1970s. Turkey's ruling Islamic party has distanced itself from its U.S. ally and placed increasing pressure on Israel. After all, Turkey has an Islamic population and any reasonable democratic regime ought to reflect the sentiments of its people. The same might happen in Egypt. As with Turkey, this would not necessarily entail a breakdown of relations between Egypt and Israel or Egypt and the U.S. Yet it would require the U.S. and Israel to accept more of the Egyptian people's grievances about the status quo in the region than they have become accustomed to doing.
If Egypt could replicate Turkey's remarkable economic success over the past decade, then the prospects for the regional economy would begin to look buoyant for the first time not just in decades but in centuries. Similarly, moderate and democratic diplomatic heavyweights to the north and west would provide an anchor for regional geopolitical stability, a moderating influence on both Israel and radical Arab regimes, and a shining demonstration of the benefits political freedom might bring to the people of the Middle East.
Ironically, this future for Egypt would simultaneously be anathema to both George W. Bush and Osama Bin Laden. It would undermine Bush's claim during his presidency that the way to promote democracy in the Middle East is though force -- since it will have been chosen by the people of Egypt rather than imposed from outside. And it would undermine Bin Laden's claims to legitimacy for exactly the same reason.
With Mubarak's fall, the future on the Middle East hangs in the balance in a way it has not since 1919. The situation is not without risks, and much depends on who comes to power within Egypt and how outside powers and leaders, especially the United States, play their hand. Yet whatever the risks, within Egypt's grasp is the prospect for its emergence as a stable democracy, a moderately nationalistic and Islamic power, and regional economic hub. This is a prize worth taking risks to achieve.
Ewan Harrison is a lecturer in political science and assistant dean in the College of Arts and Sciences at Washington University, where he also teaches classes on international relations for the Masters in International Affairs Program in University College.